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Introduction 
 
Each year, some time in late January, this writer stands at the front of a 
lecture theatre to describe to the new class of property law students the 
fundamental distinction between real rights and personal rights. This 
distinction, which was developed in Roman law, has rarely been explained 
better than in Barry Nicholas' account (An Introduction to Roman Law 
(1962), p. 100): 
 
 “Any claim is either in rem or in personam, and there is an 
 unbridgeable division between them. An action in rem asserts a 
 relationship between a person and a thing, an action in personam a 
 relationship between persons.” 
 
This distinction has, of course, been adopted in Scots law. Indeed, in 
Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19, Lord Rodger quoted the 
above passage as reflecting Scots law (para 87). 
 If then I have a real right, such as ownership, I can enforce that 
right against anyone. By contrast, a personal right can only be enforced 
against some specific person or persons. Thus, for instance, a contract 
gives rise to personal rights, which cannot therefore be enforced against 
someone who is not a party to that contract. Suppose, for example, that A 
contracts to sell his house to B. A then receives a better offer from C, who 
knows nothing of the previous agreement with B, and so A transfers 
ownership to C instead. B's only remedy is against A for breach of 
contract. As B's right is only a personal right, it gives no remedy against 
C, who was not a party to the contract. 
 For all the elegant simplicity of the real/personal model, from time 
to time a case comes along that does not readily fit. These will be cases 
where justice appears to require the person with possession or custody of 
the property to hand it over to someone with neither a real right in that 
property nor any apparent personal right against the possessor/custodier. 
The purpose of this article is to explore some of the issues arising in such 
circumstances. Four reported cases falling into this category have been 
identified, including one in 2015. 
 First, though, we need to be clear about the scope of this article. 
We are not concerned here with any case where the party seeking to 
recover the property has a real right in it, whether ownership or any other 
real right. Nor are we concerned with any case where the pursuer is a 
former possessor, seeking recovery of the property from a dispossessor, 
by means of an action for spuilzie. 
 
Pride v St Anne’s Bleaching Co and Caledonian Railway Co v 
Harrison & Co 
 
The first two of these cases are very similar. In both, a party with custody 
of goods belonging to another accidentally delivered them to someone 
else. In Pride v St Anne’s Bleaching Co (1838) 16 S 1376, the pursuer was 
a bleaching company, which held yarn belonging to two different 
customers. The pursuer accidentally delivered too much of this yarn to 
one customer (the defender) and too little to another. The pursuer paid 
the value of the difference to the customer who had received short 
delivery, and then sought to recover the excess yarn from the defender. 
In Caledonian Railway Co v Harrison & Co (1879) 7 R 151, the pursuers 
held goods belonging to a firm called Carruthers & Co, who had contracted 
to sell the goods to another firm, called Banks & Stewart. These being the 
days before the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now the Sale of Goods Act 
1979), delivery was required for the transfer of ownership of the goods. 
No delivery took place, the pursuers continuing to hold the goods for 
Carruthers & Co. Banks & Stewart then agreed to sell the goods to the 
defenders. In error, the pursuers accepted an instruction to deliver the 
goods to the defenders. When the error was discovered, the pursuers paid 
Carruthers & Co the value of the goods and then sought to recover the 
goods from the defenders. 
 In both cases, the pursuer was successful. In neither case, 
however, is the basis of the decision explained. This is not to criticise the 
justice of the outcome. On the contrary, the outcome seems entirely 
appropriate. Why, after all, should the owner of the goods have to bear 
the costs and hazards of litigation to recover them? It is better, surely, 
that these should fall on the party who handed the goods over to the 
wrong person. This is especially so where, as in these cases, that party 
has compensated the owner for his or her loss. To deny recovery of the 
goods in these circumstances would be to give a windfall to the third 
party. 
 At the same time, though, it is not easy to see a basis in legal 
principle for the outcome reached. Professor Reid has suggested that the 
pursuers' claims in these cases were based on unjustified enrichment, 
specifically the condictio indebiti ("Unjustified Enrichment and Property 
Law" 1994 Jur Rev 167 at pp. 192-193). As Professor Reid acknowledges, 
though, the term condictio indebiti does not appear and the nature of the 
pursuer's right in each case is not discussed. It is unfortunate that the 
court in neither case took the time to explain the basis of its decision. 
 A final point may be noted in passing about the decision in Pride. 
The pursuer in Pride had spindles of yarn belonging to two customers. We 
are told that these spindles were effectively identical, being of the same 
make and quality. Arguably, therefore, when they were brought together 
in the same hands, commixtio operated, rendering the yarn common 
property of the two customers (Stair, Inst. 2.1.37). If that was the case, 
the yarn delivered to the defender was in fact common property of the 
defender and the other customer, rather than belonging partly to one and 
partly to the other. It is perhaps fortunate that this issue was not raised, 
as it would potentially have complicated matters significantly. 
 
McArthur v O’Donnell 
 
In McArthur v O’Donnell 1969 SLT (Sh Ct) 24, the pursuer had entered 
into a contract to acquire goods on a hire purchase arrangement. As is 
well known, hire purchase involves goods initially being supplied on a hire 
basis, with ownership only being transferred when the final payment is 
made. The supplier of the goods therefore retains ownership until that 
point.  
 The complication in this case was that the pursuer acquired the 
goods, not for herself, but for her daughter and prospective son-in-law, 
the defender. Although the pursuer was the hire purchaser, it was found 
on the evidence that the pursuer’s daughter had actually paid the deposit 
and most or all of the instalments. The marriage took place in October 
1965, but was short-lived, the spouses separating in or around April 1966. 
Shortly afterwards, payment for the goods stopped. The defender retained 
custody of the goods. The pursuer, as hire purchaser, sought the return of 
the goods. 
 In the event, the pursuer was successful. It is difficult, though, at 
least for this writer, to find the sheriff’s reasoning convincing. The sheriff’s 
starting point was that it was “clearly settled that something less than 
ownership entitles a person to sue for recovery of goods.” However, the 
two cases cited do not support this contention. Both McBride v Caledonian 
Railway Company (1894) 21 R 620 and Main v Leask 1910 SC 772 are 
concerned with title to sue in delict if the property is damaged. It is 
certainly well established that a hirer has such title to sue, although 
neither case was actually concerned with that specific point. Main v Leask 
was concerned with a fishing boat operated on a profit-sharing basis by 
the owners and others; McBride v Caledonian Railway Company with the 
title to sue of the granter of an ex facie absolute disposition of heritable 
property, transferring ownership as security for a debt while remaining in 
occupation. North Scottish Helicopters Ltd v United Technologies 
Corporation Inc 1988 SLT 77, though, gives more recent, direct authority 
for the proposition. It has been argued by this writer (2008 SLT (News) 
257) that the hirer’s title to sue is based on being in possession of the 
property. If this is correct, the hirer’s title to sue does not arise simply 
because of the existence of the hire contract. The hirer must also show 
possession, which would only be present in McArthur v O’Donnell if it 
could be shown that the defender in some sense held the goods on the 
pursuer’s behalf. It is not clear that this was the case. 
 Be that as it may, however, the point is that the existence of title to 
sue in delict does not obviously imply a right to possession of the goods. 
There is nothing inconsistent in the law of delict allowing someone to be 
compensated for losses arising from damage to property of which that 
person has no right to recover possession. The two rights may – and often 
will – go hand in hand, but they need not. 
 The sheriff goes on to say that that pursuer’s “right under the hire 
purchase agreement is to have the use of the goods during the period of 
hire.” Clearly she did have such a right. Equally clearly, though, the right 
of a hirer of goods is a personal right, arising under the contract entered 
into with the owner, and so by definition enforceable only against the 
owner. If I have a right under a contract, I may certainly enforce that 
right against the other party to the contract. It does not follow from that 
that I may enforce the right against anyone else. Indeed, the very nature 
of personal rights precludes any such enforcement. 
 There is another way of approaching this case, from which point of 
view the hire purchase element is a distraction. Take a hypothetical case, 
where the facts were identical but the pursuer was in fact owner of the 
goods when she handed them over to her daughter and the defender. The 
marriage then broke down, and the spouses separated. Could the pursuer 
have recovered the goods in those circumstances and, if so, on what 
basis? 
 In answering this question, it would be necessary to consider first 
the basis on which the goods were handed over to the pursuer’s daughter 
and son-in-law. If the goods had been handed over as an outright gift, it 
is difficult to see any basis on which the pursuer could have recovered 
them. The possibility is excluded by the very nature of a gift. It is also 
difficult to see that the pursuer’s position would have been improved by 
being, as in the actual case, hire purchaser rather than owner: either way, 
she handed the goods over without reserving any right to return of the 
goods. As the sheriff held that she did have the right to get the goods 
back, that suggests that the sheriff did not consider McArthur v O’Donnell 
to be a case of outright gift. Accordingly, an alternative must be 
considered. 
 We look again then at our hypothetical case, of goods handed over 
by an owner to her daughter and son-in-law, the owner then claiming the 
goods back when the married couple separate. If the party handing over 
the goods is entitled to them back, there are two obvious possibilities for 
the basis of that decision. First, the intention might have been to make a 
loan. Second, there might have been a gift made conditionally on the 
continuation of the relationship. Either way, the party handing over the 
goods would have been entitled to get them back. That right, though, 
would not have arisen from any general right to possession, such as arises 
from ownership. Rather, the right to the return of the goods would have 
arisen from a contractual relationship between the parties. 
 The same must be true on the actual facts of McArthur v O’Donnell. 
Either the pursuer simply lent the goods to her daughter and the 
defender; or else she made a gift subject to a right to recover the goods if 
the spouses separated. It is not necessary to determine which one, 
although the first seems more likely given that, as a non-owner, the 
pursuer was in no position to make a successful gift. Either way, the 
pursuer would have had a right to recover the goods based on a 
contractual relationship with the defender. There was accordingly no need 
to consider whether, in the abstract, a hire purchaser has a right to 
possess the goods that may be enforced against third parties. 
 
Canning v Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The final case raising this issue is a more recent one, Canning v Glasgow 
Caledonian University [2015] SC GLA 75, 2016 SLT 56. This case has 
involves complex facts and the consideration of a variety of interesting 
legal points. These have already been the subject of a recent article by 
Malcolm Combe (2016 SLT (News) 34), and so this article will not go into 
them in detail. A brief summary of the facts is necessary, however. 
 The case involved a large quantity of material called the William 
Gallacher Memorial Library ("the library"), originally collected by Willie 
Gallacher, a founding member of the Communist Party of Great Britain 
("CPGB"). Following his death in 1965, the library came into the 
ownership of the CPGB, and was kept in premises in Glasgow occupied by 
them. In 1979, the pursuer took on a part-time, volunteer role as librarian 
in 1979, having sole responsibility for the library from 1980. When the 
CPGB had to vacate its Glasgow premises in 1987, the pursuer arranged 
for the library to move to the headquarters of the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress. In 1997, the library was moved again, to the special collections 
department of Glasgow Caledonian University ("GCU"), where it has 
remained ever since. Throughout all of this, the pursuer continued to 
manage the library. This arrangement lasted until around May 2013, when 
GCU denied the pursuer access to the library pending resolution of the 
dispute that had arisen over its ownership.  
 Ownership was claimed by the pursuer, primarily on the basis of 
abandonment. This claim was rejected by the sheriff, and correctly so. As 
is well known, abandoned moveable property falls to the Crown. 
Accordingly, even if the pursuer had proved abandonment (which she 
failed to do in any case) it would not have helped her. The library was also 
claimed by an organisation called Democratic Left Scotland, the second 
defenders. The basis of the second defenders' claim was that they were a 
successor organisation to the CPGB, which dissolved in 1991. The second 
defenders were also unsuccessful, failing to show that ownership had ever 
been transferred to them. Neither party having succeeded in 
demonstrating ownership of the library, the sheriff allowed the pursuer to 
resume her management of it. 
 It is not intended here to criticise the sheriff. Given the parties’ 
failure on the ownership question, and given that the owners of the library 
did not come forward to assert their rights, it seems appropriate to allow 
the pursuer to resume her management of the library and to make 
arrangements for its future care. The sheriff’s decision has the benefit of 
providing a pragmatic solution to the problem, allowing it to be resolved in 
an obviously appropriate way in the absence of the owners. With the 
greatest respect to the sheriff, however, it is not at all easy to understand 
the basis in principle for that decision. Let us consider the sheriff’s final 
two findings in fact and law: 
 
 “(12) The pursuer qua depositary was and remains obliged to take 
 reasonable care in the safe keeping of the library and to restore it 
 to the owner upon demand. 
 
 “(13) The pursuer qua depositary was and remains entitled to 
 exercise sole care, control and custody of the library.” 
 
Finding (12) is fair enough as far as it goes. The pursuer is under the 
obligation described. That, however, is an obligation owed to the owners 
of the library and to them alone. It is enforceable by them but, as a 
personal right, it is irrelevant to the pursuer’s relationship with anyone 
else. The fact that I may owe an obligation to one person does not, 
without more, imply that anyone else has an obligation to allow me to 
facilitate that obligation. 
 Finding (13), again, is unexceptionable as far as it goes. However, 
the nature of the pursuer’s entitlement is not explored. Certainly the 
pursuer is “entitled to exercise sole care, control and custody of the 
library” in the sense that she has the authority of the owners to do so. As 
long as that authority lasts, she cannot be criticised by the owners for any 
action she takes, as long as it is within that authority. She therefore has a 
defence in any action based on a claim that she is acting wrongfully by 
taking on the management and care of the library. It does not follow from 
that, however, that she has an active right to defend the library itself 
against third party interference or to recover it from a third party. To 
adopt a metaphor that has been used elsewhere, a legal entitlement may 
be a shield rather than a sword. That is to say, it may form the basis of a 
defence but not an active remedy. Any right that the pursuer had that was 
based on the owners’ authority was purely a personal right against the 
owners. By definition, a personal right is not enforceable against third 
parties. 
 On the conventional view of things, she would seem only to have a 
remedy against a third party interfering with the property in three 
circumstances. The first is where she could show ownership of the 
property, or some other real right affecting the property. The sheriff, 
though, rejected the pursuer’s claim of ownership, and seems clearly 
correct to have done so. No other recognised real right seems to be 
present.  
 Secondly, a possessor of property has a remedy if that possession 
is interfered with. This remedy is known as spuilzie (see K G C Reid, The 
Law of Property in Scotland (1996), paras 161-166). The pursuer did not 
however have possession, lacking the necessary intention to hold for her 
own benefit, and so the sheriff held (Canning, paras [96]-[100]).  
 Thirdly, she might have some separate right against the party 
interfering with the property. Certainly, if GCU should continue to deny 
the pursuer access to the library, they would appear to be committing a 
wrong, albeit one against the owners through their agent rather than 
against the pursuer personally. It is notable that it was with GCU that the 
pursuer made arrangements for the custody of the library. Perhaps there 
is room for implying into the agreement between the pursuer and GCU an 
obligation on the part of GCU not to deny the pursuer access to the 
library. This, though, formed no part of the sheriff’s decision. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is not intended here to question the distinction between real and 
personal rights. That distinction has proved its value over the centuries 
that divide us from the Roman jurists, and is perhaps the most 
fundamental idea in our property law. All the same, a full account of this 
distinction must take into account those marginal cases that do not readily 
fit. An attempt has been made here to give possible explanations or 
justifications for four such cases. 
 It is readily admitted that these attempts are open to criticism for 
artificiality, given that they depend on reasoning that does not appear in 
the actual cases. The response to that, though, is that the task is a 
necessary one. If these decisions are not given some kind of principled 
basis, it is difficult to know what to make of them in cases that are similar 
but are not quite in point. In all of these cases, the successful pursuer was 
the person who handed over the disputed property to the defender or at 
least, in McArthur v O’Donnell, arranged for that to happen. What, though, 
if the goods had passed into the hands of a third party? If, as has been 
tentatively suggested here, the explanation for these cases lies in the law 
of obligations, the conclusion would be that the goods could not be 
recovered from the third party. On the other hand, if the pursuer in these 
cases had some form of proprietary right, then (at least potentially) the 
goods would have been recoverable from a third party. In that case, 
though, the nature of that right would need to be worked out. If such a 
case should arise in the future, it would be better if some thought had 
been given to the problem in advance. This article has been an attempt at 
least to contribute to that process. 
